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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ·STATE OF UTAH

CLYDE HUTCHESON,
Plaintif~

and

:

Appellant,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

vs.
_LARRY GLEAVE, PATRICIA
GLEAVE, DELOY SHAW, and
HELEN SHAW,

:
:

No. 16944
Defendants and
Respondents.

:

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The parties entered· into an Earnest Money Receipt
and' Offer to Purchase Agreement.

Plaintiff thereafter defaulted

in making payment; the contract was terminated; and Defendants
retained the earnest money.

Plaintiff's complaint as amended

sought to rescind the agreement claimirig (1) that conditions
precedent had not been completed, and (2) that Defendants had
misrepresented material facts.

Plaintiff made no claim of

unjust enrichment.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Lower Court found that the Plaintiff had failed
'•

to establish a basis for either. of the causes of action
pursued by him, and further proceeded to consider -~be appropriateness of the agreed upon liquidated damages. being retained
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-2by Defendants, finding specifically that such were reasonable
and commensurate with actual damages sustained by Defenda~ts.
RELIEF SOUGHT

O~.

APPEAL

Defendants seek an affirmance of the Lower Court's
decision ..
STATEMENT OF FACTSl
In the fall of 1977 ,_·the parties negotiated concerning Plaintiff's purchasing from Defendants a large ranch in
Piute County known as the Elbow Ranch.

The Plaintiff had
~·

.

originally had contact with a real estate agent, Cathy Bagley,.
but visited the.property with one of the Defendants, who
pointed out boundaries, identifLed properties which did not
go with the sale, and

expl~ined

the sprinkling irrigation

system.
An Earne.st Money Agreement dated November

l~,

1977

was drafted, but not concurred in; a second one was drafted
and executed by the

p~rties

on December 6, 1977.

The agreement

called for certain payments and for a closing date of March
15, 1978.

Plaintiff defaulted in the payments due, and an

1

This statement of facts is designed to give a brief overview
and does not refer to the transcript nor inconsistencies with
the statement which appears in Plaintiff's brief.
This
approach has been taken because of the author's opihion that
the Plaintiff's brief is essentially an attack on the factual
findings of the district court, and on the assumption that
references to the trial trans~ript and to the allegations of
Plaintiff's brief which are inconsistent herewith can best be
handled in the argument portion of the brief.
The ~uthor
recognizes some duplication between the instant factual
synopsis and the more exhaustive treatment under his argument
and seeks the Court's indulgence as to the same.
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-3amendment to the contract was adopted February 28, 1978.

The

latter agreement modified the payment schedule and extended
the closing date to April 10, 1978.

Plaintiff was given

permission to commence his farming operation on March·

15 (before closing), and in turh the real estate agent was
authorized to release payments to the Defendants·as they·
were made by Plaintiff.
Defendants were heavily indebted to Zions Bank on
the subject ranch, which fact was discussed

amon~

t~e

parties,

and the payment schedules were designed to coordinate with
the payments due Zions, including a substantial payment due
in April, 1978.
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement thus reached,
Pla~ntiff

paid the sum of $40,000.00.·

Defendants applied

the same against their obligations; remedying a default
which then existed with Zions, and prepared to close the
transaction on April 10.
On April 10, 1978 the parties met in the office of
Defendants' attorney K. L. Mciff in Richfield, Utah.

All of

the closing documents had· been prepared and were ready for
execution; all of the parties, their attorneys, the real
estate agent, and the title company representative .were
present.

The Defendants were fully

pr~pared

perform everything incumbent upon them.

to close and to

The agreement

.

.

provided that the Plaintiff was to receive some 3,JBO acres.
Defendants were prepared to deliver 3,743.5.

The agreement

provided that the Plaintiff was to receive "all mineral,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-4oil, and gas rights presently with the ranch".

The Defendants

were prepared to deliver accordingly, and had not undertaken
to alienate any of those rights.

The Defendant~ were to

insure that there were three center pivot sprinkling systems
in complete working order.

Repres~ntatives

from the manufac-

turer of the sprinkling systems had spent the week· preceding
at the ranch, and Defendants were prepared to fully comply
with this requirement.

The approval of Zions Bank to the

transaction was to have been secured, and in factrhad been
secured.
During what was to have been the closing session,
a clarification was requested in one of the closing documents,
and a secretary was standing by prepared to make the same.
She even agreed to stay late.

Plaintiff's counsel thereupon

announced that such urgency did not exist with respect to
making any necessary corrections for the reason that Plaintiff
did not have his money.
Defendants acquiesced in Plaintiff having some
additional time; Plaintiff and his attorney representing that
they could have the money by the end of the following week,
that being approximately ten days.

As soon as the money was

in hand, they were to notify Defendants or Defendants'
attorney so that the latter could adjust the closing instruments as needed.

'
At all relevant times both before and after April
·~

10, (the agreed upon closing date), Plaintiff assured Defendant~
that he would take care of the farming operation: -that hP
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-5would plant the necessary crops; watch the sprinkling systems;
and indicated that he was moving on the premises for that
purpose.

At Plaintiff's request, Defendants

help~d

him

locate seed, machinery, financing for the latter, and farming
help.
two

In reliance on Plaintiff, Defendants ,laid off their

h~red

employees and undertook no planting _or seeding of

their own.
Plaintiff failed to do any planting;_ failed to
watch the sprinklers; and did little other than some minor
i

:;

ditch work and removed two loads of hay from the property.
As a result, the crops were not planted; the sprinklers were
not watched,_ resulting in some minor damage; and when the
transaction was terminated, Defendants had lost the utilization of the irrigated ground for the 1978 season, resulting
in an unchallenged loss to them of $56,100.00.
Plaintiff did not come up with his money some ten
days following the scheduled closing as promised, and never
at any time thereafter advised Defendants that he had his
money and was prepared to close.

The money was the subject

of numerous conversations during the months of April and May,
but Plaintiff never came up with the same.

By June 1,

Plaintiff's delinquency amounted to $110,000 and consisted of
his failure to pay the $60,000 due Apr~l-10, $25,000 due May
1, and an additional $25,000 due June 1.
Finally, on June 5, 1978 the Defendant

G~eave

and

his attorney called the Plaintiff's attorney in.Arizona and
recommended that they agree on a "cut-off" date.

Plaintiff's
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-6attorney was allowed to set the date, and set the same for
June 15, 1978.

Failing performance by Plaintiff on that

date, it was Defendants' expressed intent to "go another
route".

The telephone call was followed up on the same date

with a registered letter to Plaintiff's attorney reflecting
the agreement, indicating the loss Plaintiff would suffer,
and advising that if Plaintiff did. not perform, Defendants
"would make whatever other arrangements they deemed advantageous to them".
The cut-off date passed and nothing was heard from
Plaintiff.

The next contact from Plaintiff ·came during the

early part of July.
delinquent on their

Defendants were then over ninety days
pay~ent

due Zions Bank, and a_notice of

default had been filed by the said Bank.

Defendants advised

Plaintiff that their deal was off, but that they would

re~

negotiate a new deal with him if he would come up with his
money.

Defendants further advised that they were considering

selling their water to other potential purchasers.

Plaintiff

never did come up with any money, and finally on August 17,
1980 Defendants sold all their major water rights, applying
the down payment received to cure ·the default at Zions Bank.
Plaintiff thereafter brou~ht the instant suit seeking specific
performanc~;

then later amended seeking recission, alleging

(1) unperformed conditions precedent and (2) fraud.

'
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-7ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE' FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Plaintiff's argument on appeal is essentially an
attack on the findings of the trial court.
cited by Plaintiff has limited

~pplication,

The cas·e law
since ii is

necessarily dependent upon factual allegations or factual
determinations inconsistent or contradictory to those found
,,

by the trial court.

For the foregoing reason, an unusual amount of time
and space has been devoted to consideration of the facts as
established by the evidence and as found by the trial court.
The applicable rule of judicial review in this kind·
of case was set forth by Justice Crockett in the frequently
cited case of Charlton vs. Hackett, 11 U2d 389, 360 P2d 176
(1961), in which the court stated:
In considering the attack on the findings
and judgment of the trial court it is our duty
to follow these cardinal rules of review: to
indulge them a presumption of validity and
correctness; to require the appellant to
sustain the burden of showing error; to review
the record in the light most favorable to
them; and not to disturb them if they find
substantial support in.the evidence.
The findings of the trial court, as announced from
the bench, appear in the
304.

tri~l

transcript beginning on-page

Written findings of fact were also made by

~he

court

and appear in the record on appeal beginning at R-55.
In abbreviated form, the court found that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-8that when they met for closing on April 10, there was a
meeting of the minds on all relevant matters; that there were
only minor housekeeping items to be tended to;

bu~

that the

transaction failed to close because of Plaintiff's failure to
make the payment due.

The court further found that Plaintiff

was given an opportunity to make the payment thereafter; that
numerous contacts took place between the parties; that it was
up to the Plaintiff to get his money and notify .the Defendants;
that this he failed to do; and that at no time did he
come
,,
forward with his money.

In addition, the court found that

the matter was terminated by an agreement between Plaintiff's
attorney, Defendants' attorney, and the Defendant Gleave in
which a cut-off date was set;

t~at

Plaintiff failed to comply

with such agreement within the time frame agreed upon or any
time thereafter; that under the contract, Defendants had the
option of retaining the $40,000.00 paid by Plaintiff as
liquidated and agreed damages; that Defendants elected to
retain the same; and that the darnage3 suffered by Defendants
were at least commensurate with said amount, such damages
arising because of Plaintiff's failure to perform necessary
farming operations, and such damages further not being unreasonable in light of the size of the transaction involv~d and the
fact that Defendants' property was tied. up from December 6,
1977 through June 15, 1978.
In an effort to show the support for the

~ourt's

findings which exists in the record, and in an effort to
'

dispell misimpressions which this writer thinks are created
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~

-9in Plaintiff's recitation of the facts and the conclusions
drawn .therefrom, a careful review of relevant evidence is set
forth hereafter.
During the fall of 1977 1 Plaintiff, in the company
of a real estate agent with whom Defendants had listed their
ranch for sale, came to the Elbow Ranch and physically examined
the same with the Defendant Shaw (Tr. 210).

Shaw pointed out

the boundaries and specifically the properties 6£ Verl Henrie
and Keith Barben, which were not a part of the ranch (Tr.
210, 211).

In cross-examination, the Plaintiff acknowledged

that Shaw had pointed out the Verl Henrie property as being
excluded from the ranch, and further that while conducting
this personal examination Plaintiff had observed the Barben
property, including ·the house thereon, but didn't know if it
went with the ranch or not and didn't ask (Tr. 152, 153).
"presumed", however, that it didn't go (Tr. 157).

He

The history

of the Elbow Ranch and what properties may or may not have
been included therein at some prior point in time was not
discussed with Plaintiff (Tr. 83).
Also on the occasion of Plaintiff's visit to the
property in the fall of 1977, the Defendant Shaw showed him
the three major circular sprinkling systems and· described
their capacity ( rrr. 213).

The .capacity of the said systems I

together with supplemental systems available, exceeded the

'
capacity set forth in the real estate agency's brochure.
(Compare Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 22.)

The sprinklers were

installed
and
were
in complete
working
o~ April
10,
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
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-10(the date set for closing), as called for by the contract
{Tr. 208, 275).

1

A preliminary Earnest Money Receipt and.Offer to
Purchase {Exhibit 10) dated November_l2, 1977 was passed back
and forth between the parties, but counteroffers appearing
therein prevented its being agreed upon.

An agreement was, ·

however, reached in an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase (Exhibit 11) dated December 6, 1977.

The agreement

called for a purchase price of $962,500.00--$2,0po.po upon
execution, $8,000.00 on December 20, $10,000.00 on January 5,

$30,000.00 on February 1, etc.

Plaintiff's check or checks

for the· first two payments were dishonored (Tr. 87 and 159),
and the. agreement fell into default (Tr. 264).

The contradt

was redone on February 28 for that reason, as is evidenced by
the Plaintiff's response (Tr. 160, commepcing line 17 and
continuing. through line 20):

Q
(Mr. Mciff) So, returning to that
question, the reason that you redid the contract
on February 28th is because you were in
default, you had not made the payments?
A
corre.ct.

(Hutcheson}

Yes, that's perfectly

1 The trial transcript entries relied on by Plaintiff in his
assertion to the contrary relate to prpblems which developed
later in the season (August was the only date pinpointed) and
was fairly attributable to the Plaintiff's failure to move
onto the ranch and watch th~ sprinkling systems as he had
agreed to do (Tr. 236-328). Atter April 10, the parties had
some occasional difficulty with the sprinklers but'made
repairs and adjustments on an ongoing basis as the same
became necessary (Tr. 276). The problems which.arose during
1978 were not attributable to the manufacturer as implied in
Plaintiff's statement of facts, which point was specifically
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-11-

A third Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
was prepared bearing date of February 28, 1978 (Exhibit 12),
and was executed on March 6, 1978 (Tr. 267).

The agreement

was styled an "Amendment to Original Agreement Dated December
6, 1977" and adopted a new payment schedule as well as referring back to the December 6 agreement for certain provisions.
Under the agreement thus reached,

~laintiff

was to

receive "approximately 3,700 acres" (see Exhibit 11, line 5).
Defendants were actually prepared to deliver some 3,.743.5
acres (Tr. 85 and 157).
The December 6 agreement, as incorporated in the
February 28 agreement, provided that Plaintiff was to receive
"all mineral, oil, and gas rights presently with the ranch"
(see Exhibit 11, lines 48 and 49).

The Defend.q.nts Gleave and

Shaw never undertook to withhold any mineral rights and were
at all times prepared to convey whatever they had (Tr. 90,
112 and 253).

The Court found that the

agree~ent

was.clear

in that regard (Tr. 305), and that the Defendants were at all
times prepared to comply (Findings of Fact, Finding No. 8)·.
·The transaction was to have originally closed on
March 15 (Exhibit 11, line 17).

The final Earnest Money

Agreement provided for a closing date of April 10, l978
(Exhibit 12, lines 15 and 16), but

prov~ded

that "Seller

gives permission to the Buyer.to be on the premises and do
whatever is necessary to farm the property--as of

1978" (Exhibit 12, lines 52 and 53).

~arch

15,

In cross-examination,

Defendant acknowledged this responsibility (Tr. 160, line 21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-12Q
(Mr. Mciff) Now, when you entered
into the agreement of February 28th, you set a
closing date of April 10th; isn't that correct?
A

(Hutcheson)

Yes.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) At which time you were
to make a payment of $60,000.00?

A

(Hutcheson)

Correct.

Q

(Mr. Mciff)

True?

A

(Hutcheson)

True.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) And notwithstanding
that closing date of April 10th, you were to··
enter into possession on March 15th and commence
the farming operation; true?
A

(Hutcheson)

True.

In consideration of being entitled to commence the
farming operation, the Plaintiff agreed that the payments
made by him prior to the closing date could be released
directly to the Defendants (Tr. 218).

The Defendant Shaw.

testified that tho Plaintiff was going to plant crops of
varying acres under the three sprinklers (Tr. 219); that he
went with Plaintiff to Intermountain Farmers and arranged· for
oats and alfalfa seed (Tr. 220); that he

a~d

Gleave went with

Plaintiff to arrange financing on a tractor at Valley Central
Bank (Tr. 219); that at Plaintiff's request he lined up a
farmer to disk and prepare the ground for planting (Tr. 220);
that he was later advised by Plaintiff that Plaintiff had
arranged with someone from Beaver to do the preparation work;
and that never at any time did the Plaintiff ever's~y that he
was not going to handle.the farming operation (Tr. 234).

In

response to the gues.tion "did he assure you that .. he was going
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-13to undertake the farming operation" the Defendant Shaw testified "Yes, he told me all the time that he was going to start
farming it.

He would come up from Arizona and I would assume

that he was·going to start, and then he would be gone, and
then he would call me on the phone and tell me that he had a
few things down there and that he would be up in a few days
to get ready to start doing it."

(Tr. 220, line 29 through

Tr. 221, Line 3).
When asked a similar question, the

Plaintiff'~

,,

response was uncertain but falls short of a denial (Tr. 162,
lines 7 through 12):

Q
(Mr. Mciff) And you
them that you were ~oing to do
were actually going to do what
done to get the farm operation
you not?

represented to
that; that you
needed to be
started; did

A
(Hutcheson) I don't know if I told
him I would do it.
I just wanted the right if
I wanted to.
The Plaintiff did, however, acknowledge that he
intended to plant under the third sprinkler and some

unde~

the first sprinkler (Tr. 162 and 163); that the Defendant
Gleave helped him locate seed, checking first in Richfield,
then Denver, and ultimately locating the same in Delta (Tr.
163 and 164); and that Shaw, in fact, assisted him in locat-

ing equipment to do the preparation work (Tr. 164).

The

evidence further showed that Plairttiff did do some ditch work
(Tr. 205), and removed two loads of hay from the

pr~perty

(Tr. 234).
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-14In reliance on Plaintiff, Defendants laid off two
hired men whom they.had previously employed (Tr. 217); the
necessary soil preparation and planting was not accomplished;
no crops were raised under two of the sprinkling systems and
only a partial crop under the third {Tr. 221 and 222).

The

uncontradicted and unchallenged evidence before the Trial

,·

Court was that the net loss to the Defendants, after deducting
the costs and expenses· of a normal operation~ was $56,100.00
(Tr. 233 and 258) 1
Plaintiff's allegation in his statement of facts
that the Defendants continued in possession of the property
and operated i t "as usual" during the entire year of 1978 is
not supported by the evidence.

Plaintiff.cites Tr. 238 and

239 wherein the Defendant Shaw explained that the livestock

remained on the ranch about the same as in other years, but
earlier in his testimony he had explained that the Plaintiff
was originally going to buy Defendants' livestock, and when
an agreement was not reached thereon, the Plaintiff decided
he wouldn't run livestock and agreed that the Defendants

1 Plaintiff asserts that since he was entitled to possession,
under Defendant's theory, he was also entitled to all of the
crops produced. That agrument may have merit if the Plaintif.f had paid Defendants the fair rental .value of the ranch
for the 1978 season, either in cash or~y sharecropping.
Under Plaintiff's theory, Defendants would lose the entire
1978 crop, the utilization
the crop ,ground, receive no
rental value, and then be required to return the $40,000.00
received from Plaintiff, a sum significantly less -than the
uncontroverted evidence as to the damages sustained by
Defendants.

of
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-15could run their stock on the ranch during the 1978 season.
(Tr. ·223, 224). 1
The parties met as scheduled on April 10, 1978 in
the office of the Defendants' attorney, Mr. Mciff, for the
purpose of closing the transaction.

The parties were all

present, represented by counsel, an<l the real estate. agent
and the title company representative were in attendance
(Tr. 71} •
All of the documents required for

clo~in~

had been·

prepared and were presented at the closing session (Tr. 72
and 84).

A succinct narration of what occurred in the

closing session appears in the testimony of the Defendant
.Gleave.

Beginning with line 15 on page 272 of the trial

transcript, the following appears:
A
(Gleave} On April 10th when we met
the payment, everything was laid on the table,
we were prepared to close. Then I didn't see
a check floating around.
I asked Clyde Hutcheson
if he had his money.
Q

(Mr. Mciff)

A

(Gleave)

And what was his response?

He said, "No, we don't."

Q
(Mr. Mciff) Did you have any further
discussion regarding your obligation to Zions?
A

(Gleave)

Yes.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) Would you tell us what
was said on that occasion?

1 The Defendants' proof of damages did not claim any loss by
not being allowed the use of the grazing rights.
They limited
their claim and proof thereof to loss of crops, which would
normally have been cut and harvested from the irrigated
ground ..
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(Gleave) We told him it was very .
difficult for us to wait any longer on him;
that we needed to do something fast in order
to mak2 our paym~~t to Zions Bank.

Q
·(Mr. Mciff)
Did Mr. Hutcheson ever ·
indicate that he wouldn't have to make those
payments until October 15th?
A

·{Gleave)

No.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) When is the first fime
you ever heard that suggestion?
A

(Gleave)

Yesterday in Court.

1

Q
(Mr. Mclff) Was there any 4isGussion
at that meeting as to when that payment, that
$60,000.00 payment could be made?
A
(Gleave)
Both he and John Robinson
at that meeting, who was his attorney, assured
us that payment would be made by the end of
the week.
Q

(Mr. Mciff)

A

(Gleave)

The following week?

The following week.

Q
(Mr." Mciff) At that meeting were
you and Mr. Shaw ready, willing and able to
conclude the transaction?

(Gleave)
A
we were there.
THE

COURT:

MR. McIFF:

Yes, that was the reason
At what meeting?
April 10th.

A
(Gleave)
On April 10th we were
ready, willing, and able.

1

Plaintiff gave contradictory testimony. At various point~
of the trial, he said that he did not have to make'any additional payments, including the closing payment, ~ntil October
15,· though in cross-examination he twice admitted that he was
obliged to make the payments as scheduled.
The full text of
his testimony to that effect, appears on pages l~ and 24 of
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Q
(Mr. Mciff) On April 10th were the
sprinkling systems up and in operation?
A

(Gleave)

Yes.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) Had Valmont [the manufacturer] been there the preceding week?
A

(Gleave)

Yes.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) When we met on April
10th for the purpose of closing, were all of
these proposed closing documents acceptable to
you?
A

(Gleave)

Yes, they were.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) At that meeting was
there any discussion about Zions Bank approving
the sale to Mr. Hutcheson?
A

(Gleave)

Yes, there was.

Q
(Mr. Mciff)
connection?

What was said in that

A
(Gleave) Mr. Bushnell asked me if
permission had been granted by Zions Bank and
I told him it had.
Q
of fact?
A

(Mr. Mciff)
(Gleave)

And was that a matter

Yes, a matter of fact ..

Q
(Mr. Mciff) Was there a discussion
about the Verl Henrie property and the Keith
Barben property?

A
(Gleave).
the closing, yes.

They were pointed out in

Q
(Mr. Mciff) And was there any
objection raised in relation to those items?A

(Gleave)

No, there was not.
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Q
(Mr~ Mciff·)
Was there a discussion
about the mineral rights?
A

(Gleave)

Yes.

Q
(Mr. Mciff). When you advised the
parties that that document stood [pre-existing
lease on certain of the mineral rights], was
there any objection?

A

(Gleave)

No, there was no objections.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) You've heard some
discussion and some testimony about redrafting
the Uniform Real Estate Contract or ma~ing a ·.
modification in it?
A

(Gleave)

Yes.

Q

(Mr. Mciff)

What did that relate

to?
A
(Gleave) It related to a Quitclaim
Deed, in the documents, and there's no reference
to it in the Uniform Real Est~te Contract. We
wanted a reference made to tlv1t Quitclaim Deed
entered into the contract and while we were
sitting at the desk someone raised the question,
"How long will that take, 0 and you called your
secretary into the room and she stated she
would stand by while we discussed it in order
to type up that document th.at day.

Q
(Mr. Mclff} Were there any other
things you recall about the contract that were
modified or changed in any respect?

A·

(Gleave}

No.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) And the .suggested
reference to the Quitclaim Deed was that by
way of modif icatiqn· or ciarif ication?
A

(Gleave)

Clarification. 1
"'·

1

The real estate agent, Cathy Bagley, agreed that any change
was
properly characterized as a "clarification" and not a
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Q
(Mr. Mclff) Mr. Gleave, were there
to your. knowledge any items to be subsequently
ne.gotiated upon, any items that there had not
been an agreement, concerning which there had
not been an a·greement reached?

A

(Gleave)

No.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) Would you tell the
Court the discussion--the relationship that
was had in relation to the redrafting of the
basic contract?
A
(Gleave) The redrafting of the
basic contr~ct was only to pick up this o~e
incident you have already noted. We w~re
prepared to redraft it there that day. We
were having to keep Mr. Mciff's secretary late
in order to do it and she agreed to stay late.
When the money,· when we. realized, and this
discussion wa~ after the money--when we realized
that.

THE

COURT:

Who said what to whom?

(Gleave) Mr. Mciff agreed there
A
that we would redraft the documents, called
his secretary into the office, and asked her
if she would stay and type the documents as we
needed them. She agreed to do so. Then John
Robinson said at that time that we didn't need
to hurry· that fast, that they weren't prepared
to make a payment anyway, so we could redraft
the documents as soon as they got their money.

a·
(Mr. Mciff) Was there any discussion
as to what was to trigger that or how we were
to know?
A
(Gleave) Now, John Robinson was
going to call and tell us when they had the
money ready for us.·
Q
(Mr. Mciff) And when he called us~
and advised us that they had the money :r::eady,
what was to happen then?
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(Gleave) We were to prepare the
documents and.have them ready so they could
give the money to us and transfer the documents ..
Q
(Mr. Mclff)
that at any time_?
A

(Gleave)

Were you

prepare~

to do

Yes.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) Were you ready, willing,
and able at all times to close this transaction?

A

(Gleave)

After--

Q

(Mr. Mciff)

A

(Gleave)

After April 10th?

After April 10th, yes, ...

1

Q
(Mr. Mciff) You previously testified
that, as I recall, John Robinson said he would
call us that next week and hopefully call at
the end of the next week. To your knowledge,
did we ever get such a call?
A

(Gleave)

No, we didn't get such a

call.
Q
(Mr. Mciff) To your knowledge did
we ever receive a call advising them that
we're to close?
A

(Gleave)

No.

In an effort to justify his failure to make the
payments, Plaintiff's brief places improper reliance on a
hand-written note of the real estate agent, Cathy Bagley,
which appears at the bottom of the February 28 agreement.
That

hand~written

note is as follows:

1

The Defendant Shaw testified to the same effect (Tr. 253).
Also, the real estate agent,· Cathy Bagley, called by Plaintiff as a witness, testified that Defendants were prepared to
close the transaction up until the point that it v.ra'S anno:.d1ced
that Plaintiff did not have his money (Tr. 86). She further
testified that any redrafting or further preparation of
closing documents was awaiting notification from Plaintiff's
attorney (Tr •. 92), and that Defendants were at all times
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-21The balance of 1978 payments is to be secured
by a mortgage on a 42-unit motel known as the
"Time Motel" of Flagstaff, Arizona, or property
of similar value. Interest at the rate of
8-1/2% per annum on the unpaid portion.of the
down payment will be due and payable when the
balance of the 1978 payment is made (No.later
than October 15, 1978).
The record is void of any evidence to support Plaintiff ls
conclusion that the payments Plaintiff was obliged to ·make·
were conditioned upon a sale in Arizona. 1

The handwritten

statement, when carefully read, simply provides that Plain:"

,.,

tiff was to secure the 1978 payments with a mortgage

2

on

Arizona property, and further.that the interest on such
payments was due no later than the final 1978 payment which
was due October 15.
Real estate agent Cathy. Bagley, who made this handwritten entry, gave the following testimony with respect to
the same (Tr. 89, line 18 through Tr. 90, line 2):

Q
(Mr. Mciff) Okeh, and specifically,
·what I'm asking you is this: Was that, based
on your conversations with the parties, designed
to eliminate the necessity of Plaintiff making
the payment at the time of the closing?
A

(Bagley)

No.

Q
(Mr. Mciff)
closing payment?

He was to make the

1 Plaintiff's effort to tie the sale of 150 acres of farm
ground in Arizona to the agreement to give a mortgage on a
motel in Arizona has no ra~ional basis or support in the
record. The mortgage was to have secured the remaining 1978
payments of principal and interest and made no raference to
the source of those payments. The record does not disclose
whether or not Defendants were even aware of the Arizona farm
ground at the time the contract was entered into.
2

s

It Sponsored
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(Bagley) He was to make that
payment and also to give us a mortgage •••• He
was to give the $60,000.00 and then secur~ the
· other one with the mortgage.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) But itis true, is it
not, that he was to make each one of. thesepayments as they become due; isn't that right?
A

(Bagley)

That's right, yes.

The real estate agent's commission was to be paid
out of the 1978 payments which fell due after the closing.
The propose~ closing documents (Exhibit ·16) provided that
certain amounts were to go to the real estate agency from the
payments as they were made on May 1, June l, and October 15,
1978 respectively (Tr. 90 and 274).
The Plaintiff, in cross-examination, acknowledged
the necessity of his making the payment at the time of closing
and the subsequent 1978 payments and of his failure to do so.
Beginning with line 3 on page 168, the Plaintiff testified as
follows:

Q
(Mr. Mciff)
I'll rephrase it then:
We had come to that meeting for the purpose of
closing this transaction? That was the purpose
of that session; was it not?
A
(Hutcheson)
understanding.

Q

(Mr. Mciff)

A
(Hutcheson}
final papers.

I believe that was our
Alright.
We had to go over the

Q
(Mr. Mclff) And we proceeded in·
that vein until one point in the meeting when
you and your counsel made a certain anno~ncement
which cut short our closing efforts; is that
right?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-23A

(Hutcheson)

That, I don't remember.

Q
(Mr •. Mciff)
Isn't it a fact that
you and your counsel announced during that
session that you didn't have your money?.

A
(Hutcheson)
I don't remember the
announcement you're talking about.
Now, John
might have said something but I don't remember
it.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) Isn't it a fact that we
discussed that at great length, the problem of
money?
A

(Hutcheson)

Of money, we d~d·~·

Q
(Mr. Mciff) And the problem with
your getting your money?
A

(Hutcheson)

Yes.

Q
(Mr. Mciff)
Isn't it true that you
did not have it at that time?

it.

(Hutcheson) We didn't have all of
A
We did have part of it at that time.

Q
(Mr. Mciff)
Isn't it a fact that
you expressed to us the hope that you'd be
able to get your money in the not to·o distant
future?
A

(Hutcheson)

I did, yes.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) And, in fact, you
estimated at that time that maybe by the end
of next week, you'd be able to have your
money?
A
(Hutcheson)
just what time.

That, I don't remember

Q
(Mr. Mciff) But you did make an
estimate that you would be able to get your
money?
A

(Hutcheson)

Yes.

Q

(Mr. Mciff)

In the not too distant

future?
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Q
(Mr. Mciff) And that· money you were
talking about was the $60,000.00 that was
needed to close it; is that correct?

A

(Hutcheson)

Correct.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) So,
had to be paid at the time
that, in addition to that,
payment due on May 1st and
June 1st?

you knew that money
of closing and
you had to pay this
the payment due on

A

(Hutcheson)

That was the schedule,

Q

(Mr. Mciff)

And you knew that;

yes.
right?
A

,,

(Hutcheson)

Q
(Mr. Mciff)
modified; was it?

A
(Hutc~eson)
believe it was.

Right.
~And

that· was never

After that, I don't

Subsequent to the failure to close on April 10,
numerous contacts took place between the parties or their
agents relating to whether or not the Plaintiff was going to
be able to come up with his money.

The· real estate agent,

called by Plaintiff as a witness, testified as follows
(Tr. 102 lines 9 through 16):
Q
(Mr. Mciff} Did you in the last two
or three days check your telephone record and
determine as a result thereof that during
April and May you contacte~ Mr. Hutcheson on
many occasions to try to bring.this thing
tog~ther, if he could get his money?
·

A

{Bagley}

That's right.

1 See, also, Plaintiff's testimony from Tr. 160, line
' 21 et.

seq., set forth previously on page 12 in which he acknowledged that he was to make a payment of $60,000 ·on the date
of closing, April 10, 1978.
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(Mr. Mciff)
his money?
A

(Bagley)

But he could never get

Well, he never did.

The Plaintiff acknowledged these contacts.

Beginning on line

17 page 177, the following testimony appears:
Q
(Mr~ Mciff)
Mr. Hutcheson, isn't it
a fact that during the latter part of April
and all of May, we had numerous contacts with
you for the purpose of determining whether or
not you could come up with the money?

A

(Hutcheson)

You had contact with

Q

(Mr. Mciff)

Well

A

(Hutcheson)

No.

me?

Q
(Mr. Mciff)
Cathy Bagley?

Mr. Gleave, Mr. Shaw or

A
(Hutcheson) I did talk to Cathy
Bagley and also with Larry and Deloy possibly.
Q

(Mr. Mciff)

Right.

A
(Hutcheson) But not on numerous
times but I would say two or three times,
somewhere in there.
Similar testimony from the Plaintiff appears beginning
on line 17 page 171 of the transcript:
Q
(Mr. Mciff) Subsequent to the
meeting of April 10th, isn't it true that
Cathy Bagley contacted you on a number of
occasions, like the 11th, 12th, 19th, 20th,
25th of April, May 11th, 12th, 16th and the
subject of all those· contacts from Cathy
Bagley was whether or not you could come up
with your money?

A
(Hutcheson) That is not true, ,
because we had other business with Cathy.
Q
(Mr. Mciff) Well, let me.just
rephrase it:
Isn't it true that was discussed
in
many
of
those
conversations.
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(Hutcheson) I don't know just how
many but it was discussed a few times~
(Emphasis
added)
Plaintiff went on to testify that he would not

ha~e

closed if

he would have had a million dollars, 1 but that he never
conveyed that information to Mr. Gleave or Mr. Shaw, but that
he did "mention" it to Cathy Bagley, the real estate agent·
(Tr. 172).
From the beginning of the negotiations between the
parties, it was discussed that the reason for the sale and
the payment schedules agreed upon were geared to meet Def endants' obligations in favor of Zions Bank and secured by a
trust deed against the ranch (Tr. 269).

Defendants' had an

obligation due Zions Bank of some $72,000.00 on April 1, 1978
(Tr. 269).

As o_riginally agreed, the transaction between the

parties was to have closed on March 15, some fifteen days
before the payment was due Zions.Bank (Exhibit 11).

As

previously noted, the agreement was modified to allow a
closing date of April 10, but with farming operations to
commence March l~.

In re~erence·to the obligation at Zions,

the real estate agent testified:

Q
(Mr. Mciff) You knew they had a
payment due April 1st which was to be paid
out of $60,000.00 on the closing payment~
A

(Bagley) . That's right.

~This self-serving declaration is of the kind one-c~n indulge
in when he does not have the money and is therefore not
obliged to deal responsibly with the factual reality of being
able to perform. Plaintiff testified that he was in financial
difficulty
in 1978
(Tr.
167).
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Q
(Mr. Mciff) That was discussed
among all the parties?

A

(Bagley)

Q

(Mr~

A

(Bagley)

Yes.

Mciff)

Discussed on April

10th?
Yes.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) Did you become aware
that
when
Mr.
Hutcheson didn't come un with
.
his money did Mr. Gleave and Mr. Shaw see
other buyers?
· ·
~

A
(Bagley) Yes.
I don't know whether
I was--I thought they probably would. . ~
(Tr. 103, lines 6 ~hrough 18)
As above noted, there followed several contacts
between the parties or their agents during the months of
April and May for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not
the.Plaintiff was going to be able to come up with his money.
Finally, on June 5, 1980 Defendants, through their attorney
Mr. Mciff, initiated .a contact with Plaintiff's attorney John
Robinson in Arizona.

The latter was Plaintiff's exclusive

attorney in the instant matter (Tr. 178), and the Court
specifically found that he was the agent of the Plaintiff and
that the Plaintiff was bound by his representations (Tr.
305).
This contact resulted in a three-way telephone
conversation between the Defendant Gleave, the Defendants'
attorney Mr. Mciff, and the.Plaintiff's attorney Mr. Robinson.
The conversation was taped, and the tape was admitted in
evidence as Exhibit 26.

A transcript of the said conversation

appears as an addendum to this brief.
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-28The conversation in gues~ion sets several things to
rest.

It successfully rebutted the theory of unperformed

conditions precedent and the theory of fraud; which formed
the basis of the two causes of action set forth in the Plaintiff's second amended complaint.

After receiving assurance

that the sprinklers were working, the following appears:
MR. McIFF: Any other obstac1e, John,
that you see that we need to resolve?
MR. ROBINSON; On your end of it,
I really don't. The only thing I was ?oq~
cerned about was making sure the sprinklers
were taken care of.
(Emphasis added}.
(Tr.
290, lines 22 through 26).
The fact that everything hinged on Plaintiff .being able to
come up with his money ap·pears clear throughout the conversation.

The long delay was acknowledged and· Mr. Robinson

thanked the Defendants for their patience (Tr. 292).

The

fact that the conversation was "amicable" as Plaintiff asserts
in his brief, should be viewed as no more nor no less than a
tribute to reasonable men.
Plaintiff's brief erroneously asserts that the
parties agreed the "cut-off" date was not critical.

To the

contrary, Mr. Gleave stated, "I think we can live with the
15th [the agreed upon date], but it couldn't be any later
than that."

(Emphasis added)

(Tr. 290, lines 2 and 3).

The "cut-off date" was fixed by the Plaintiff's
attorney Mr. Robinson (Tr. 289).

If the Plaintiff could not

'

perform by then, then it was the Defendant's itated intent to
"do something. else" (Tr. 289, line 18), and further if the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.

-29deal could not be closed on or before that date, the Defendants
were going to "go another route" to try to solve their problem
(Tr. 291, line 17 and 18)

i

their specific problem-being that

they were then in default some sixty-five days on the payment
due Zions Bank.

To

Mr. Mciff's assertion that his client

Gleave was "really concerned", the fol lowing appears.:
MR. ROBINSON':
I

Wel 1, I don It blame him.

would be too.

MR. McIFF: The bank is really pressing
us. We feel like we've really got to ,do ,,
.something.
MR. ROBINSON:

I don't blame· you a bit.

(Tr. 288, lines 1 through

~)

The parties then proceeded to agree on the "cut-off" date of.
June 15, 1980.
Plaintiff has sought to rely on the Defendant
Gleave's reference to the fact that the Defendants would have
ninety days following the filing of a notice of default by
Zions Bank (Tr. 292).

The Defendants' comment does not

fairly relate to an extension of the "cut-off date", but
rather to the time frame in which the Defendants would have
to solve their problem presumably by finding another buyer
who could purchase a ranch valued at

$962~500.00.

It should

be added parenthetically what appears to be obvious, and tl).at
is that finding a buyer for this

~ize

of transaction is not·

an easy task, and that ninety days for that

pur~ose

normally be woefully inadequate.

would

...

Immediately following the telephone conversation, a
letter
was prepared and mailed to the Plaintiff's.. attorney
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-30John Robinson by regi~tered mail (Tr~ 293)~

The letter was

prepared in the presence of the Defendant Gleave and reviewed
by him immediately prior to mailing (Tr. 293 and 294).

The

Plaintiff testified that his attorney at trial (Mr. Olsen)
had secured a copy of the same from his attorney in Arizona,
and the Plaintiff's copy was produced in open court at the_·
·time of trial (Tr. 176 and 177).

The letter was received in

evidence as Exhibit 21, a photocopy of the same being attached
as an addendum to the instant brief.
The letter recites the agreement reached in the
telephone conversation, and provides in part as fol lows,_ towit:
In any event, we have agreed on Thursday,
June 15, 1978, as a cut-off date to complete
the transaction_and tender the money. Failing
your client's being able to perform on that
date, Gleave and Shaw would be entitled to
make whatever other arrari.gements they Q.eemed
advantageous: to them.
The letter further recites "if you wish to use this
letter to illustrate the loss your client will suffer, feel
free to do so".

Plaintiff's awareness of the impending loss

was discussed in the telephone conversation:
MR. McIFF: Tell your people that Clyde's
put some money in it that he runs the risk of
losing, and that he'd better be aware of .that.
MR. ROBINSON:
aware of that.

I've made. them all totally
(Tr. 290, lines 11 through 15)

No contact was received from the

Plaint~f~

or his

attorney between June 5 and the agreed upon cut-:-off date of
June _15 (Tr. 294).

On July 7, 1978, Zions Bank recorded a
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-31notice of default against the Defendants premised on their
failure to make the payment that had been due April 1 (Tr.
272).

Also in the forepart of July, the Defendants received

the first contact they had had from either the Plaintiff or
his attorney since the June 5 telephone conversation (Tr.
294).

Pursuant to agreement, .the parties met at the Big Rock

Candy Mountain Cafe in southern Sevier County (Tr.

~95).

Gleave's account of the conversation was as follows, to-wit:

A
(Gleave)
Clyde told us that he had
talked with John Robinson and he said,,. "What
are you going to do with me now".
Q

{Mr. Mclff)

What else was said?

A
(Gleave)
I told him that as far as
we were concerned the deal was off but if he
would come up with his money, we would renegotiate a new deal.
Q
(Mr. Mciff) Did you have any discussion about other transactions you were then
considering?
A
(Gleave) Yes.
I told him at that
time that we were considering selling the
water to Virginia Jenkins or to Allen Nielson.

Q
(Mr. Mciff) Did he, at any time
prior to your concluding the transaction with
Virginia Jenkins contact you and advise you
that he had his money?
A

(Gleave)

No~

(Tr. 295, lines 10 through 25)

·on August. 17, 1978, the Defendants

enter~d into an

agreement with Virginia Jenkins to-sell all of the water
rights which had historically been used for the
irrigation system (Tr. 295 and 298).

sprink~ing

'
The Defendarits. received

$50,000.00 down payment from Virginia Jenkins which was
immediately
tendered to Zions Bank (Tr. 298).
As ·noted
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-32above, at no time prior to concluding the transaction witti
Virginia Jenkins did the Plaintiff advlse that he had his
money and was prepared to go forward (Tr. 295).

POINT II
SUBSEQUENT TO TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT,·

PLAINTIFF HAD NO INTEREST IN THE P ~:OPER'I'Y
OR RIGHTS IN RESPECT TO RESALE BY DEFENDANTS
Frorn·and after April 10, 1978, the date set for the
closing, the Plaintiff was in default under the terms of the
agreement and would have been constantly aware

t~1ereof.

· .To

have sent him a notice that he was in default would have been
a meaningless act.

The only question was how long this

default was going to be allowed to continue.

As the evidence

recited heretofore clearly establishes, Plaintiff initially
estimated that he would be able to cure his default within
some ten days.

Almost two mon'f:hs elapsed before the Defendants

brought the matter to a head, though there were several
contacts during the interim relating to whether Plaintiff was
going to be able to get the money.
In lieu of unilaterally fixing a cut-off date for
Plaintiff to cure his default, Defendants allowed the date to
be fixed by Plaintiff's attorney and then concurred therein.
It seems elementary that a cut-off date actually agreed to is
preferable to one unilaterally

imp~sed,.

though Plaintiff's

argument implies that such a· notice from the Defendants to
the Plaintiff would have been adequate.

'

The trial court found that the matter was finally
terminated by mutual agreement in the June telephone conversaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-33tion.

That was the clear intended result of the parties, as

is evidenced by the registered letter sen.t to Plaintiff's
attorney on the same day a~ the conversation.

Wh~n

no further

response was received from Plaintiff until substantially
after the "cut-off" date which had been agreed upon, it was
reasonable and proper to conclude that the Plaintiff was not
going to perform,

~ither

because

h~

could not, or had deter-

mined to abandon any effort theretoward, and i t was further
proper for Defendants to take "some other route" to,, solve
their problem as they had advised of their express intent so
to do.
In the case Wiscombe vs. Lockhart Co., 608 P2d 236
(1980), in_an opinion by Justice Wilkins, this court held
that once a contract has been properly terminated, then the
vendee in default has no further interest in the property.
In that case, an assignee {Lockhart) of the vendee, sought to
reinstate a contract which the latter had permitted to go
into default only a brief three weeks earlier.

The Court

held that if the termination is proper then the property
remains in the vendor, no longer subject to the contract. 1
Plaintiff has sought to rely on a sale made by the
Defendants subsequent to Plaintiff's breach and subsequent to
------~--

-----~---------

1 This does no~ leave the defaulting vendee without a remedy.
He can stil 1 pursue an actic::m in unjust enrichment, pr.oviding
the facts will suooort the same.
Such an action is not
premised on the c~~tract, but, to th~ contrary, r~cognizes
that the same is over, and that the property has gone b~ck to
the vendor.
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-34the agreed on termination.

The problem with that position

can be readily·seen from this text:
The general rule that a vendee in defau~t
cannot recover back the money he has paid on
the contract has been applied where the vendor,
after a default of the vendee, has retaken
possession of the property or has resold it.
It has been said that i t is immaterial that
the vendor, after the purchaser has expressly
refused to complete the purchase and has
renounced the contract, resells the land,
since to say·that the subsequent sale of the
land gives a right to the purchaser to recover
back the money paid on the contract would, in
effect, be saying that the vendor could n~ver ..
sell it without subjecting himself to A~ r
action by the purchaser, and this has been
held true although the vendor, immediately
after the renunciation of the contract by the
purchaser, resold the land at an advanced
price.
(77 Am Jur· 2d 628, Vendor and Purchaser,
§503)
Consistent with the foregoing language, the Utah
court in the early case of Foxley vs. Rich, 35 U 162, 99 P
·666 (1909), held that the fact that the vendor, under a
contract to convey, breached and aba.ndoned the contract by
conveying to another would not justify _the failure of the
contract vendee to make payments due before that time, so as
to entitle him to rescind and recover payments already made.
POINT III
PLAINTlFF 1 S COMPLAINT FAILS TO GIVE RISE
TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE REASONABLENESS OF
AGREED UPON DAMAGES RETAINED BY DEFENDANTS.
The contractual proyision governing the retention
of the monies advanced is as follows:

'
In the event the purchaser fails to pay -the
balance of said pu~chase price or complete
said purchase as herein proviqed, the :amounts
paid hereon shall, at the option of the seller,
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-35be retained as liquidated arid agreed damages
(Exhibit 12, lines 37 and 38).
Plaintiff's.complaint, as amended, contained two
causes Of action.

The first cause of action alleged unper-

formed conditions precedent, and the second cause alleged
fraud.

The remedy Plaintiff sought in both instances was ·

rescission and return of monies paid.
The court found against Plaintiff on both of his
causes, and further found that the transaction

was~ter~inated

because of the default of the Plaintiff, and because of his
failure to cure the default within the specific time frame
agreed upon.

The Court's findings were supported by substan-

tial evidence as heretofore discussed.
Plaintiff did not plead nor prove unjust enrichment,
apparently electing to take an all or nothing approach with
the two causes advanced.
Notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to plead or
prove unjust enrichment, the court did proceed to co~sider
the reasonableness of the damages agreed upon and retained by
Defendants, to-wit $40,000.00.

The unchallenged and uncontra-

dieted testimony before the court was that Defendants had
sustained a loss of $56,100.00.

This amount related to crop

loss and did not attribute anything ·to other factors which

have been considered in the long line of Utah cases dealing
...

with this subject, some of which are discussed in Plaintiff's

brief.
Defendants' ranch was tied up in the subject transSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-361977 through June 15, 1978.

While Defendants were permitted

to gra.ze their livestock, the several hundred irrigated acres
were not planted and no harvest was reaped from the major·
portions thereof.

The trial court found that this loss was

premised on the Plaintiff's failure to perform as agreed.
The Plaintiff argues that any loss sustained by the
DefendaJ?-tS during the 1978

far~ing

season was overcome by a

sale of the water which occurred in the fall.

The answer to

that is that if Defendants would have been able to farm·the
property, or if Plaintiff would have paid a fair rental, one
or the other being clearly proper, then Defendants would have
had those sums in addition to any sums resulting from the
subsequent sale.
Plaintiff further asserts that the sale ultimately
made by Defendants was sufficiently advantageous to overshadow
any loss during the 1978 farming season.

That argument fails

for two reasons, the first of which was set forth in the
preceeding section and is simply- that once the agreement was
terminated the subsequent sale is irrelevant, unless perhaps
it were to arise in an unjust enrichment action wherein the
seller was seeking to assert a claim for "loss of an advantageous bargain", that being an appropriate element of a
seller's damage.
(1952).

Perkin.s vs. Soencer, ·121 U 468, 243 P2d 446

Defendants have not registered such a claimo
Plaintiff's argument fails for the furtl~~ reason

that there was inadaquate evidence to determ~ne ·just how
advantageous
the
subsequent
sale
was
Defendants.
The
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-37Defendants sold all their major water rights at a price
substantially less than the proposed sale to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff has sought to fix values on rem~ining property

by relying on a real estate listing agreement which predates
the sale to Plaintiff, and which called for prices substantially in excess of those actually negotiated with Plaintiff.
The proof, therefore, is not competent even if it were relevant.
CONCLUSION
The findings and the judgment of the triaJ court
are supported by substantial evidence, and are entitled to a
presumption of validity.
The court found that the parties reached an agree-·
ment; that the transaction failed to close because Plaintiff
failed to make his payments; that he was granted additional
time and still failed; that the transaction was terminated by
an agreement reached through counsel; that the monies retained
by Defendants were commensurate with losses actually sustained
.and were reasonable; and that Plaintiff had failed in his
burden of proving the causes of action which he had advanced.
Reviewing the record in a light most favorable to
the Court's findings and judgment dictates that they are
entitled to be affirmed.
Respecti~ully

submitted,

K. L. Mc
JACKSON,
151 Nor n Main Street
Richfield, Utah · 84701
Telephone:
896-5441
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Served two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent upon Plaintiff's/Appellant's attorney, Tex R.
.
~1
Olsen, by delivery to his office this
(J~y of November,

1980.
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June 5, ·1973

Mr. John B. Robinson
counselor at Law
709 South Highway 89A
P. O. Box 216
Cottonwood, Arizona 86326
Dear John:

;

'

~ill confirm the
conve~sation of this

This
telephone
and me.

understariding arrive4 at.in the
date between_you, 'Larry Gleave,

You anticipate that you will be able to be in Richfield
on Monday, June 12, to execute all the documents and close the
transaction between your client, Clyde Hutcheson, and my clients,
Gleave and Shaw.
You anticipate that you may be able to make
payment prior to that date.
In any event, we have agreed on Thursday, June 15, 1978,
as a cutoff date to complete the transaction and tender the

money.
Failing your client•s being able to perform on that date,
Gleave and Sh~w would be entitled to make whatever other arrangements they deemed advantageous to them.
I have apprcci~tcd working with you and recognize that
you and your client have been in somewhat of a dilemma in trying
to solve~ the problems in Arizona.
Perhaps by setting a deadline
we will assist your efforts.
If you wish to use this letter to
illustrate the loss your client will suffer, feel free to do so.
Sincerely yours,

KLM/a
'
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8

{lfoereupon Def end ants'

9

_Exhibit No..

was <luly_

received in evidence) ..

:o
11

26

11
•

HR.. McIFF:

Operator, I'm calling John Robin,,

.·~

"'rid like to

12

son, Area Code 602, Telephone 634-5551'.·..

13

charge that to 896-5441 and report the charge back

14

to that number.

Your name?
Kay L. Mc If f.

J"'s~t
(Fol~ OV\-f )
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